Public educational institutions, including public schools, are generally exempt from county land rates where the land is used for the statutory exempt purpose. The exemption is now expressly provided for under section 38 of the National Rating Act, No. 15 of 2024, which came into force on 24 December 2024.
However, the precise position depends on the nature and use
of the land, the period for which rates are being demanded, the ownership of
the property and whether any part of the land is being used for profit or
residential purposes.
1. The current statutory exemption
The principal provision is section 38 of the National
Rating Act, 2024.
Section 38(2) provides that a County Executive Committee
Member shall not charge rates for land used exclusively for public purposes.
More specifically, section 38(3)(d) provides that valuation
for purposes of rating shall not be conducted in respect of land used for “public
educational institutions and libraries.”
This is a significant statutory protection for public
schools.
Accordingly, where land is genuinely used as a public
educational institution, the County ordinarily has no basis for subjecting that
land to valuation for purposes of imposing ordinary land rates under the
National Rating Act.
The exemption is, however, subject to the proviso in section
38 that the exemption does not apply to land used for profit or residential
purposes.
2. The exemption existed under the previous law
Where a County Revenue Authority is demanding arrears
relating to a period before 24 December 2024, the applicable legislation must
also be considered.
Before the National Rating Act came into force, the relevant
provisions were contained in the Valuation for Rating Act, Cap. 266.
Section 27(1)(d) of that Act provided that no valuation for
rating purposes was to be made in respect of land used directly and exclusively
for:
“educational institutions (including public schools within
the meaning of the Basic Education Act...)”
The provision also extended to residences of students
provided directly by educational institutions or forming part of, or ancillary
to, educational institutions.
The statutory proviso excluded land used for profit or,
subject to specified exceptions, residential purposes.
The former Rating Act, Cap. 267 also operated
together with the Valuation for Rating Act in the rating regime.
The Rating Act and Valuation for Rating Act were
subsequently repealed by the National Rating Act, 2024, which commenced
on 24 December 2024.
Consequently, where a County is demanding historical
arrears, it is important to identify the particular years for which the rates
are allegedly due rather than treating the entire demand as governed by the
current Act.
3. The courts have recognised the exemption for
educational institutions
There is a particularly relevant Kenyan decision on this
issue.
In Republic v County Government of Machakos ex parte
Victory Faith Ministries [2018] eKLR, the Environment and Land Court at
Machakos considered a rates demand of approximately Kshs. 58 million in respect
of property used for religious and educational purposes.
The County argued, among other things, that the schools
operating on the property were commercial institutions because students paid
fees.
The court rejected that argument on the evidence before it.
Justice Angote held that section 27(1)(d) of the Valuation for Rating Act
exempted land used for educational purposes, subject to the statutory exclusion
relating to land used for profit.
Importantly, the County had not produced evidence
demonstrating that the schools were being operated for profit. The court
consequently held that the demand for rates was unlawful and granted the relief
sought by the applicant.
The decision is particularly useful because it demonstrates
that the mere fact that students pay school fees does not, without more,
establish that land is being used for profit for purposes of the statutory
rating exemption.
The critical question is the actual character and purpose of
the use of the land.
4. “Public school” and “commercial school” should not
automatically be treated as the same
The distinction between a public educational institution and
a private or commercial educational enterprise is important.
Section 38(3)(d) of the National Rating Act expressly refers
to public educational institutions and libraries.
Therefore, where the property is occupied and used by a
public school for ordinary educational purposes, the statutory exemption is
considerably stronger.
A County Revenue Authority should not simply assume that
land is rateable because:
- students
pay fees;
- the
institution collects money;
- the
institution has income;
- the
institution operates a school canteen;
- the
school has boarding facilities; or
- the
school has other incidental revenue-generating activities.
The legal question is whether the land is being used for the
exempt educational purpose or whether it is being used for a separate profit-making
purpose within the meaning of the statutory proviso.
The decision in Republic v County Government of Machakos
ex parte Victory Faith Ministries [2018] eKLR is useful in this respect
because the court required evidence establishing that the school was in fact
operated for profit before the exemption could be displaced.
5. Incidental commercial use may require separate
consideration
The exemption should not, however, be interpreted as an
absolute exemption covering every activity conducted on land belonging to a
public school.
For example, a school may have land containing:
- classrooms
and laboratories;
- administration
offices;
- teachers'
accommodation;
- boarding
facilities;
- playing
fields;
- a
school library; and
- other
facilities directly connected with education.
These uses would ordinarily have a strong connection with
the educational purpose.
But suppose part of the school's land is separately leased
to a commercial entity for a supermarket, petrol station, commercial office,
private residential development or other independent profit-making enterprise.
The County may then have an arguable basis for treating that
portion differently.
The wording of section 38 must therefore be applied to the actual
use of the particular land or portion of land rather than merely to the
identity of the registered proprietor.
6. Payment of fees does not necessarily destroy the
exemption
This is an issue likely to arise where the County argues
that a school cannot be exempt because it collects fees.
That argument should be approached carefully.
The fact that an educational institution receives fees does
not necessarily mean that the land is being used for profit.
In Republic v County Government of Machakos ex parte
Victory Faith Ministries [2018] eKLR, the County made substantially that
argument. The court nevertheless found that the County had failed to establish
that the schools were being operated for profit and held the rates demand
unlawful.
The focus should therefore be on the purpose and
character of the land use, rather than merely the existence of revenue.
For a public school, this distinction is particularly
important because the collection of fees or other statutory charges may form
part of the financing of educational services without converting the
institution into a profit-making commercial enterprise.
7. Ownership of the land is also important
The legal analysis should also establish who owns the land.
There is an important distinction between:
- land
registered in the name of the National Government;
- land
held by a county government;
- land
vested in another public body;
- land
registered in the name of a school or educational trust; and
- privately
owned land upon which a public school operates.
The treatment of public land may involve the statutory
regime concerning contribution in lieu of rates, rather than ordinary
rates imposed on private rateable property.
Under the former regime, for example, section 25 of the
Valuation for Rating Act dealt with the basis upon which public land was valued
for purposes of contributions in lieu of rates.
The current National Rating Act contains its own provisions
concerning public land and contributions in lieu of rates.
Consequently, before responding to a County's demand, the
school's title and the legal status of the land should be established.
8. The County cannot rely solely on its valuation records
The fact that a property appears on a County valuation roll
or rates account does not necessarily resolve the question of whether the
property is legally rateable.
If the property falls within a statutory exemption, the
County must apply the exemption.
This principle is particularly relevant where a public
school has been incorrectly entered as an ordinary rateable property.
In Republic v County Government of Machakos ex parte
Victory Faith Ministries [2018] eKLR, the County sought to justify its
demand partly on the basis of its records concerning the property's use. The
court nevertheless considered the statutory exemption and the evidence
concerning the actual use of the property.
A school receiving a rates demand should therefore ask the
County to identify:
- the
statutory provision under which the rates are demanded;
- the
valuation roll in which the property appears;
- the
registered owner;
- the
assessed rateable value;
- the
period to which the demand relates;
- the
basis upon which the County considers the land to be rateable;
- whether
the County alleges that the land is being used for profit; and
- the
evidence supporting that allegation.
9. The constitutional framework
County governments derive their power to impose property
rates from Article 209(3)(c) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
That provision gives county governments power to impose
property rates.
However, the power to impose rates is not unlimited.
The County must exercise its rating power within the
framework established by national legislation, including the National Rating
Act and any applicable county legislation.
The principle that a public authority must act within the
limits of the power conferred upon it is well established in Kenyan
administrative law.
In Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial
Bank Limited & 2 others [2012] eKLR, the Supreme Court affirmed the
fundamental principle that jurisdiction is derived from the Constitution or
statute and cannot simply be assumed.
Similarly, in Suchan Investment Limited v Ministry of
National Heritage & Culture & 3 others [2016] eKLR, the Court of
Appeal emphasised the importance of legality and lawful exercise of statutory
powers by public bodies.
A County Revenue Authority therefore cannot impose or
recover a charge merely because its internal records indicate that an amount is
outstanding. The demand must have a lawful statutory foundation.
10. What should a public school do upon receiving a rates
demand?
A public school that receives a rates demand should not
simply ignore it.
A formal objection or response should be prepared
identifying the statutory exemption and providing evidence of the school's
status and use of the property.
The response should ordinarily attach, where available:
- the
title or lease;
- evidence
establishing that the institution is a public school;
- registration
or establishment documents;
- evidence
showing the actual use of the property;
- the
school's physical development or site plan;
- relevant
correspondence with the County;
- previous
exemption correspondence, if any; and
- the
County's rates demand and relevant valuation records.
The school should expressly invoke section 38(3)(d) of
the National Rating Act, 2024 where the demand concerns the current rating
regime.
For historical demands, the response should additionally
invoke section 27(1)(d) of the former Valuation for Rating Act, Cap. 266,
where applicable.
11. The position in summary
The legal position can therefore be summarised as follows:
First, public educational institutions are expressly
recognised as exempt from valuation for rating purposes under section
38(3)(d) of the National Rating Act, 2024.
Second, land used exclusively for public purposes is
protected under section 38(2).
Third, the exemption is subject to the statutory
qualification concerning land used for profit or residential purposes.
Fourth, for periods governed by the previous rating
regime, section 27(1)(d) of the Valuation for Rating Act, Cap. 266
expressly exempted land used directly and exclusively for educational
institutions, including public schools.
Fifth, the decision in Republic v County
Government of Machakos ex parte Victory Faith Ministries [2018] eKLR
provides useful judicial authority on the application of the
educational-institution exemption and demonstrates that the County must
establish the factual basis for alleging that an educational institution is
being operated for profit.
Sixth, the ownership and actual use of the land must
be examined carefully, particularly where the property is public land or where
only part of the property is used for educational purposes.
Conclusion
A County Revenue Authority cannot properly demand ordinary
land rates from a public school without considering the statutory exemption
applicable to public educational institutions.
Where the land is used for the public educational function, section
38 of the National Rating Act, 2024 provides a clear statutory basis for
exemption from valuation and rating.
Where the demand relates to an earlier period, the
corresponding exemption under section 27(1)(d) of the Valuation for Rating
Act, Cap. 266 should be considered.
The strongest response to a rates demand should therefore
not merely state that the school is “government property” or that it is a
“public institution.” It should establish the ownership, statutory status
and actual use of the land, identify the applicable rating legislation for
each period claimed, and expressly invoke the statutory exemption.
Where the County alleges that the property is being used for
profit, the school should require the County to identify the factual and legal
basis for that allegation. The decision in Republic v County Government of
Machakos ex parte Victory Faith Ministries [2018] eKLR demonstrates the
importance of evidence on this issue.
Accordingly, where a public school has received a
substantial rates demand, the matter should be formally challenged rather than
the demand being accepted at face value.
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